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VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
his supervisory duties; rather, he is now protected in the performance
of any act that furthers his employer's interest, even if he performs rank-
and-file work during a strike. The instant cases, at the very least, reflect
a labor philosophy of the D.C. Circuit that tends to promote the individ-
ual rights of union members at the expense of union powers of control
over its membership. Beyond this, however, the cases may indicate a
conscious effort by the judiciary to achieve a proper balance between
the rights of the union and the employer, prompted perhaps by the belief
that Allis-Chalmers and Scofield shifted the balance too far in favor of
the union. Whatever is the correct characterization of the court's mo-
tives, promulgation of the furtherance of interest doctrine has raised
serious questions concerning its scope and validity. The most pressing
problem is the necessity to establish meaningful limits on the doctrine
to determine how far the supervisor-member may go in the name of
furthering the employer's interest when his actions are also in deroga-
tion of the union's objectives. The resolution of this question will deter-
mine the long-range impact of the principle on the ability of the union
to maintain its internal membership solidarity. Finally, the logical in-
firmities in some of the court's arguments and the questionable bases
for parts of its reasoning illustrate the dangers of a hasty approach to a
complex problem, and, when combined with the ambiguities inherent in
the furtherance of interest doctrine, may weaken significantly the
union's collective bargaining position.
Labor Law-The National Labor Relations Board
Redefines and Restricts the Scope of Managerial
Employee Classification
I. INTRODUCTION
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)' provides that certain
classes of employees are excluded from the Act's coverage of bargaining
unit formation and employee activity. The National Labor Relations
Board has added to this unprotected category two classifications of
employees-those who are engaged in management policy formulation
or effectuation (managerial employees) and those who assist manage-
ment in the formulation of labor relations policies (confidential employ-
ees)-because of their close affiliation with management. The concept
1. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970).
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of managerial employee, however, has not been defined precisely and
thus has given rise to considerable confusion when applied in various
factual settings. In two recent Board rulings, North Arkansas Electric
Cooperative, Inc. ,2 and Textron Inc. ,3 the Board has attempted to re-
strict the scope of the managerial classification to only those employees
involved in shaping or implementing management's labor policy, rather
than to those involved in effectuating any management policy; this re-
definition thus has rendered the managerial employee classification vir-
tually indistinguishable from that of the confidential employee. This
Comment will endeavor to analyze the Board's action and to identify
its underlying rationale.
II. BACKGROUND
The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 defined an employee in
section 2(3) as "any employee" but specifically excluded agricultural
laborers, domestic servants, and members of the employer's immediate
family.' In order to further the purpose of the Act, which was to encour-
age collective bargaining and to provide labor with bargaining power
equal to that of management, 5 the term "employee" has been construed
broadly by the courts to cover all employees who do not fall within a
specific exclusion.' As a result of this congressional and judicial encour-
agement, between 1935 and 1947 union membership increased from
3,000,000 to 15,000,000, and in industries like coal mining, construc-
tion, and transportation, as many as 80 percent of the employees came
2. 168 N.L.R.B. 921 (1967), on application for enforcement order, 412 F.2d 324 (8th Cir.
1969), on remand, 185 N.L.R.B. No. 83, 75 L.R.R.M. 1068 (1970), enforcement denied, 446 F.2d
602 (8th Cir. 1971).
3. 190 N.L.R.B. No. 66, 77 L.R.R.M. 1265 (1971), motion to reconsider, 196 N.L.R.B. No.
127, 80 L.R.R.M. 1099 (1972).
4. 49 Stat. 450. The only other main classification found in the NLRA was that of "em-
ployer," defined in § 2(2) to include "any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or
indirectly. ... Under the NLRA it was recognized that one could occupy a dual status in
relation to the definition of employer and employee; i.e. in relation to his employer, one might be
an employee under the Act, but in relation to the persons under him, one could at the same time
be an employer. NLRB v. Armour & Co., 154 F.2d 570, 574 (10th Cir. 1946).
5. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 126, rehearing denied, 322 U.S. 769
(1944); see NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
6. For example, the Supreme Court has included independent contractors within the defini-
tion of "employee," NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944). In the Hearst case,
traditional common-law concepts defining the legal relationship of master and servant were re-
jected and the proper approach was delineated as one that defined "employee" in terms of the
history and purpose of the statute. Id. at 124. In addition, the Court has construed the term
"employee" to include foremen and other supervisory personnel. Packard Motor Car Co. v.
NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947); see American Steel Foundries v. NLRB, 158 F.2d 896, 898 (7th Cir.
1946).
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under collective bargaining agreements. 7 When industry-wide strikes
threatened to cripple the national economy in 1946, however, antiunion
sentiment arose mong the electorate and within Congress,8 leading to
the passage of an amended version of the NLRA in the Taft-Hartley
Act of 1947.1 The amended NLRA abandoned "the policy of affirma-
tively encouraging the spread of collective bargaining and [attempted to
strike] a new balance between protection of the right to self-
organization and various opposing claims"'" by instituting a public
labor policy "of modified encouragement coupled with regulation.""
Although it retained the basic definition of "employee" as set forth in
section 2 (3), the amended version of the NLRA expressly excluded two
classes of employees that the courts previously had considered within
the statutory definition: the independent contractor and the employee
exercising supervisory authority. 12 This addition thus brought to a total
of five the number of specific statutory exclusions from the Act's defini-
tion of "employee."
With the NLRA's broad definition of "employee" and its congres-
sional purpose as statutory guidelines, the National Labor Relations
7. ABA SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS LAW, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 35 (Morris
ed. 1971).
8. Reilly, The Legislative History of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 285, 288-
89 (1960-6 1); see Aaron, Amending the Taft-Hartley Act: A Decade of Frustration, I1 IND. &
LAB. REL. REV. 327, 328 (1957-58). During the first week of the 1946 congressional session more
than 200 bills were introduced dealing with labor relations varying in degrees of extremism. ABA
SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS LAW, supra note 7, at 36-39; see Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1, 48 (1947).
9. See Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136. The basic finding
of the LMRA was that the activities of the unions, as well as the activities of the employer, were
a potential source of obstruction to the free flow of commerce and a potential source of industrial
strife. See 23 NOTRE DAME LAW. 238, 241 (1947-48). For a statement of the official congressional
findings see 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
10. Cox, supra note 8, at 4. Professor Cox directly attributes this change in policy to a belief
that unions were so strong that "legislative action was required to redress the balance of power in
the collective bargaining process." Id. at 44. See Reilly, supra note 8, at 285.
11. A. SLOANE & F. WITNEY, LABOR RELATIONS 104 (2d ed. 1972).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970): "The term 'employee' shall include any employee, and shall
not be limited to the employees of a particular employer ...and shall include any individual
whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or
because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially
equivalent employment, but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer,
or in the domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed by his
parent or spouse, or any individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any individ-
ual employed as a supervisor ...." The effect of these additional statutory exclusions was to
directly overrule prior court decisions. See cases cited note 5 supra; NLRB v. Edward G. Budd
Mfg. Co., 169 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1948); L.A. Young Spring & Wire Corp. v. NLRB, 163 F.2d
905 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (2 early cases recognizing the change wrought by the LMRA on the status
of supervisors under NLRA).
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Board has been delegated the function of determining, on a case-by-case
basis, the precise parameters of the term "employee.""3 In making
these determinations, the Board necessarily performs a pragmatic func-
tion, fusing an appreciation for the economic realities of a particular
industry with the implementation of congressional aims." At least in
theory, its everyday experience in the administration of the statute gives
the Board a familiarity with "the circumstances and background of
employment relationships in various industries, with abilities and needs
of the workers for self-organization and collective action, and with the
adaptability of collective bargaining for the peaceful settlement of their
disputes with their employers."' 5 This experience enables the Board to
segregate the communities of interest in working situations on wages,
hours, and conditions of employment,"8 and thereby determine the scope
of the term "employee" in a given case. The Board, however, has gone
beyond its express authorization to proceed on a case-by-case basis, and
has isolated and excluded two classes of employees from coverage under
the Act because of their close relationship with management: employees
who have access to information or assist management in the formula-
tion of employer labor relations policies (confidential employees), and
employees who are involved in the formulation or effectuation of man-
agement policies (managerial employees). These employees are ex-
cluded to the same extent as statutorily excluded employees-all are
outside the Act 7 for purposes of the employee rights accorded by section
718 (including bargaining unit representation) and denied protection
13. The NLRB is given both judicial and investigatory powers. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 160 -
61 (1970).
14. NLRB v. E.C. Atkins & Co., 331 U.S. 398, 403 (1947); cf Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
15. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944).
16. See ABA SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS LAW, supra note 7, at 217-18. Professor
Morris listed several factors which should go into the process of segregating the community of
interests: method of wage computation; hours of work; benefits; common supervisor; qualifications
required; training and skills developed; difference in job functions and the amount of working time
spent from the plant situs; contact with other employees; history of collective bargaining; and the
integration of work functions with other employees.
17. See Iowa Indus. Hydraulics Inc., 169 N.L.R.B. 205, 210-11 (1968); Swift & Co., 115
N.L.R.B. 752, 753 (1956); W. WILSON, LABOR LAW HANDBOOK 1 216, at 85 (1963).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970): "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring member-
ship in a labor organization as a condition of employment . .. ."
1973]
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from what otherwise would be unfair labor practices under section 8,1
despite the lack of any reference to either classification in the language
of the NLRA.
Authority for Board exclusion of managerial employees is based on
two closely related theories. First, in the process of unit determination
authorized by section 9(b),'2 the Board must weigh the "policy of the
Act to insure employees the fullest freedom in exercising their rights
• . . [with] the interest of an . . . employer in maintaining. . . labor
relations."'2 Consequently, the power to exclude a managerial em-
ployee, even though not specifically provided for in the statute, could
emanate from the discretionary power of the Board to formulate appro-
priate bargaining units.2 2 Secondly, a more cogent rationale suggests
that the Board impliedly characterizes managerial employees as "super-
visory employees" and brings them within the ambit of a specific statu-
tory exclusion.2 3 Although neither of these explanations is entirely sat-
isfactory, the power to exclude managerial employees from coverage of
the Act has been exercised by the Board without challenge for the past
37 years.
24
An examination of Board pronouncements indicates that several
standards have been considered in the determination of managerial sta-
tus. The most frequent formulation of the test for a managerial em-
ployee is whether the employee in question is one "whose interests are
identified with management, and who may be regarded as a representa-
19. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970). This section makes it an unfair labor practice for the employer
to interfere with employees in the exercise of § 7 rights, to interfere with the formation of or
operation of any labor organization, to utilize hiring or firing techniques to discourage membership
in a labor organization, to discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges with the
Board, or to refuse to bargain collectively. This section also contains similar caveats with respect
to the union organization. It is possible that a managerial employee, even though excluded from
the Act, would be afforded some protection in a situation where discrimination against him would
have the effect of restraining or coercing other employees in the exercise of their organizational
rights. See NLRB v. Dal-Tex Optical Co., 310 F.2d 58, 62 (5th Cir. 1962).
The proposition that an employee can be excluded from a bargaining unit but still be included
under the protection of§ 8 has been rejected as anomalous. Thus in the past, inclusion or exclusion
from the Act has been considered total. NLRB v. Wheeling Elec. Co., 444 F.2d 783, 788 (4th Cir.
1971).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970): "The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to
assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this subchapter, the
unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit,
plant unit, or subdivision thereof .... "
21. Continental Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 727, 728 (2d Cir. 1969).
22. See International Metal Prods. Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 65, 66-67 (1953).
23. C. MORRIS, supra note 7, at 217; cf. Ross Porta-Plant, Inc. v. NLRB, 404 F.2d 1180
(5th Cir. 1968).
24. See Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp., 75 N.L.R.B. 320, 323 n.4 (1947).
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tive of management . . . ."5 A frequent use of this "alignment of
interest" phraseology may be seen in situations in which an employee's
inclusion in a bargaining unit with rank and file employees may produce
a division of loyalties; for example, when the employee must inspect the
finished product for quality .2  Interest alignment has also been utilized
when an employee's job entails work independent of the rank and file, 2
or causes the employee to have more contact with management than the
average member of the appropriate unit.2 1 Secondly, the Board has
frequently characterized "those who formulate, determine and effec-
tuate an employer's policies" as managerial employees.29 Whether an
employee formulates, determines and effectuates company policy is de-
termined in most cases by the quantum of discretion exercised by the
employee in relation to the pre-existing policy guidelines of manage-
ment,30 and the amount of independent judgment exerted in relation to
the amount exercised by rank and file members of the unit in ques-
tion." The exercise of independent judgment alone is not sufficient,
because the Board has held that the use of technical or professional
25. J.L. Brandeis & Sons, 54 N.L.R.B. 880,884 (1944); see W. WILSON, supra note 17, 1 218,
at 88.
26. See Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 162 F.2d 435, 439 (7th Cir. 1947); Brooklyn
Borough Gas Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 18, 21 (1954).
27. See Vulcan Corp., 58 N.L.R.B. 733, 736 (1944).
28. See Grocers Supply Co., 160 N.L.R.B. 485, 488 (1966); Cherry & Webb Co., 93
N.L.R.B. 9, 10 (1951); American Locomotive Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 115, 118 (1950). Interest alignment
has been alternatively phrased in terms of "whether an individual, because of his relation with a
supervisor or officer of the employer . . . [has] a special status as to warrant his exclusion from
the bargaining unit." See W. WILSON, supra note 17, 218, at 88. In 1966, the D.C. Circuit, in
Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. NLRB, 366 F.2d 642, attempted to synthesize into a workable set of
standards the Board's prior pronouncements concerning the determination of managerial status.
The following 2-part test was set forth in Retail Clerks: first, "whether, even if [the employees in
question] do not supervise other workers, their position with the employer presents a potential
conflict of interest between the employer and the workers"; and secondly, whether the employees
"formulate, determine and effectuate employer's policies," or whether they "have discretion in the
performance of their jobs" and do not have to "conform to an employer's established policy
... "Id. at 644-45. This formulation has been utilized with apparent facility by both the Board,
see Iowa Indus. Hydraulics, Inc., 169 N.L.R.B. 205, 211 (1968), and by the courts, see Westing-
house Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 1151, 1158 (7th Cir. 1970).
29. See, e.g., International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 116, 123
(2d Cir. 1964), citing AFL-CIO, 120 N.L.R.B. 969 (1958); Eastern Camera & Photo Corp., 140
N.L.R.B. 569, 571 (1963); Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp., 75 N.L.R.B. 320, 323 n.4 (1947).
30. In Eastern Camera & Photo Corp., 140 N.L.R.B. 569 (1963), the Board stated that "the
determination of an employee's 'managerial' status depends upon the extent of his discretion,
although even the authority to exercise considerable discretion does not render an employee mana-
gerial where his decision must conform to the employer's established policy." 140 N.L.R.B. at 571.
See also Iowa Indus. Hydraulics, Inc., 169 N.L.R.B. 205,212 (1968); Kitsap County Auto. Dealers
Ass'n, 124 N.L.R.B. 933, 934 (1959).
31. See Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 670, 674 (1966).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26
judgment will not make one a managerial employee.3 Furthermore, it
has been held that mere access to information essential for policy deter-
mination, and attendance at management meetings do not constitute
policy "formulation. 3 3 Often in applying these standards the Board
has focused on the particular job function of the employee; for example,
if an employee is in a position to extend the credit of his employer,34
he is managerial.
35
The test for confidential employee classification has remained rela-
tively unchanged since 1946,36 when the Board determined that confi-
dential status depended not only on "access to. . .data bearing directly
upon employees' labor relations," but also upon whether the employee
32. Iowa Indus. Hydraulics, Inc., 169 N.L.R.B. 205, 211-12 (1968). In this case, the Board
set forth what it considered basic areas of managerial decision making: investment of capital;
choice of goods to be manufactured; selection of customers and suppliers; and the establishment
of pricing and credit policies. Id. at 211. See Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 60 N.L.R.B. 626, 628-29
(1945) (the job of a time-study employee gave him a "controlling role in the setting of wage rates,"
a "function of management," with the result that the employee should be excluded),
33. Newark Stove Co., 143 N.L.R.B. 583, 586-87 (1963).
34. See Kearney & Trecker Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 817, 822 (1958); Mack Trucks, Inc., 116
N.L.R.B. 1576 (1956); Girdler Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 726, 729 (1956). Contra, St. Cloud Rendering
Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 1069, 1072 (1952).
The following are broad job classifications that consistently have been viewed as managerial
by employers and generally found to be so by the Board: employees with the power to pledge the
employer's credit, Grocers Supply Co., 160 N.L.R.B. 485 (1966); Eastern Camera & Photo Corp.,
140 N.L.R.B. 569 (1963); Kearney & Trecker Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 817 (1958); Peninsular Metal
Prods. Corp., 116 N.L.R.B. 452 (1956); Swift & Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 752 (1956); Girdler Co., 115
N.L.R.B. 726 (1956); Curtiss-Wright Corp., 103 N.L.R.B. 458 (1953); American Locomotive Co.,
92 N.L.R.B. 115 (1950). Contra, Continental Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1969); Oscar
Ewing Co., 124 N.L.R.B. 941 (1959); Kitsap County Auto. Dealers Ass'n, 124 N.L.R.B. 933
(1959); St. Cloud Rendering Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 1069 (1956). Time checkers and time study
personnel, Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 60 N.L.R.B. 626 (1945); Oliver Farm Equip. Co., 53 N.L.R.B.
1078 (1943); Bendix Aviation Corp., 47 N.L.R.B. 43 (1943). Contra, Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B.
1317 (1946). Unit managers, department managers, and local representatives, Garden Island Pub-
lishing Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 697 (1965); General Tel. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1225 (1955). Contra, Eastern
Camera & Photo Corp., 140 N.L.R.B. 569 (1963); Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp., 75
N.L.R.B. 320 (1947). Assistant Managers, J.L. Brandeis & Sons, 54 N.L.R.B. 880 (1944). Contra,
Newark Stove Co., 143 N.L.R.B. 583 (1963). Work expediters, ACF Indus. Inc., 145 N.L.R.B.
403 (1963); Bendix Aviation Corp., 47 N.L.R.B. 43 (1943). Engineers, NLRB v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 405 F.2d 1169 (2d Cir. 1968); American Locomotive Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 115 (1950);
Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corp., 54 N.L.R.B. 103 (1943).
35. These "credit" cases seem to rely on the idea that the pledging of credit is in itself a
"managerial prerogative," rather than upon a consideration of the amount of credit pledged or
the amount of discretion involved. See Swift & Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 752, 753 (1956). Contra,
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 1151, 1158 (7th Cir. 1970). The Board has also
determined that possession of trade secrets, which if disclosed would be injurious to the employer,
will not alone cause one to obtain managerial status. See Allied Chem. & Dye Corp., 116 N.L.R.B.
1649, 1652 (1956); Oliver Farm Equip. Co., 53 N.L.R.B. 1078, 1081-82 (1943); cf. Yale & Towne
Mfg. Co., 60 N.L.R.B. 626, 628, (1945).
36. See Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322 (1946).
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must "assist and act in a confidential capacity to persons who exercise
'managerial' functions in the field of labor relations.""7 The exclusion
of confidential employees from the coverage of the Act is consistent with
the Act's primary purpose of promoting industrial harmony through
collective bargaining,3 in that the employee should not be placed in a
position involving a potential conflict of interest, and management
should not be forced "to handle labor relation matters through employ-
ees represented by the union with which the company is required to deal
. . ,"I Thus, in contrast to its application of a broad managerial
classification standard to all areas of management policy determination,
the Board has precisely defined the confidential employee classification
and narrowly limited its scope to labor relations activities."
Once the Board has determined that either managerial or confiden-
tial status exists, judicial review is limited. The courts employ the stan-
dard of "substantial evidence"; the Board's determination cannot be
overturned if it is "supported by substantial evidence on the record
considered as a whole," with special cognizance of the "infinite varia-
tions and gradations of authority [that] can exist within any one in-
dustrial complex," and the Board's expertise in dealing with these deter-
minations.4
III. THE BOARD AND THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT: RECENT CONFLICT OVER
THE MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEE
In North Arkansas Electric Cooperative,42 the employer, North
Arkansas, had dismissed one of its employees, an electrification advisor
named Lenox, for failure to obey a request to remain neutral during a
union certification election. The employer argued that this action did
not constitute an unfair labor practice under section 8(a) of the Act
37. This definitional test for confidential status was expressly reaffirmed in 1956, in B.F.
Goodrich Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 722, 724 (1956), and the modern formulation requires essentially the
same standard: whether one "assists and acts in a confidential capacity to persons who formulate,
determine and effectuate management policies in the field of labor relations . See Westing-
house Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 669, 670 (6th Cir. 1968).
38. NLRB v. Wheeling Elec. Co., 444 F.2d 783 (4th Cir. 1971).
39. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 669, 670 (6th Cir. 1968); see NLRB v.
Wheeling Elec. Co., 444 F.2d 783, 788 (4th Cir. 1971).
40. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 669, 670-71 (6th Cir. 1968).
41. NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 405 F.2d 1169, 1172-73 (2d Cir. 1968).
42. 168 N.L.R.B. 921 (1967). The employee, Lenox, was classified as a manager on the
employer's wage schedule, was paid a salary on a monthly basis within the range of a manager's
salary, was given travel insurance as were other managers, made recommendations, attended
management meetings, was given an advertising budget, handled customer complaints, and repre-
sented North Arkansas before civic organizations. Id. at 922-23.
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because Lenox was a managerial employee.43 In opposition, the Gen-
eral Counsel argued that (1) Lenox's position was not managerial, and
(2) even if it were, he should nevertheless be protected from unfair labor
practices.44 Having rejected the General Counsel's second contention,
the trial examiner found no exercise of discretion by Lenox outside
limits set by his employer, and no potential conflict of interest from his
inclusion in the bargaining unit; consequently, the examiner concluded
that Lenox was not a managerial employee. The Board adopted the trial
examiner's determination, stating that the Act is "remedial in charac-
ter" and should be "broadly construed to accomplish its purpose" of
protecting the organizational activities of employees, and therefore con-
cluded that Lenox was an "employee" within the meaning of section
2(3) and that his discharge constituted an unfair labor practice.
On the Board's application for enforcement, the Eighth Circuit
reversed,4 5 finding that the determination of nonmanagerial status was
"neither warranted by the record nor supported in law."46 The court felt
that the Board's finding might have been unduly influenced because the
case involved an unfair labor practice question rather than a bargaining
unit determination, and emphasized that this factor should have no
bearing on the determination of managerial status.4" The court, how-
ever, remanded for a specific determination whether a managerial em-
ployee can nevertheless be protected by the Act against employer prac-
tices that would constitute unfair labor practices if directed against
employees covered by the Act.
Although the question presented by the Eighth Circuit had been
answered negatively in dicta on the first hearing of North Arkansas,48
the Board on remand undertook to reformulate the definition and scope
of the managerial employee exclusion.4" Recognizing that no precise
formulation of the term "managerial employee" had ever been success-
fully attempted, the Board declared that standards used in unit determi-
nation cases were not "genuinely relevant" to cases involving unfair
labor practices. For unfair labor practice cases, the Board stated that
43. The testimony indicated that Lenox had attended a meeting at which the union had been
discussed, and had made remarks concerning the IBEW. NLRB v. North Arkansas Elec. Coopera-
tive, Inc., 412 F.2d 324, 325 n.1 (8th Cir. 1969).
44. 168 N.L.R.B. at 924.
45. NLRB v. North Arkansas Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 412 F.2d 324 (8th Cir. 1969).
46. Id. at 327-28.
47. Id.
48. 168 N.L.R.B. at 924.




managerial status should turn on whether one has "either real or appar-
ent authority to speak as an 'employer' in a labor relations or employee
relations context."5 In other words, the Board proposed to apply old
standards of managerial status only in unit determination cases and to
employ a narrower definition of managerial employee in unfair labor
practice situations: one might be a managerial employee in the sense
that he lacked the requisite community of interest necessary to be in-
cluded in a proposed unit but still be entitled to the Act's protection
against unfair labor practices. Applying its new standard, the Board
found no support for the premise that Lenox "participated in the formu-
lation, determination, or effectuation of policy with respect to employee
relations matters," or that any other employee was led to believe that
Lenox had "substantial responsibilities in this area" to the extent that
his views would be considered those of North Arkansas, or that there
was any conflict of interest in Lenox's performance of his job and
potential union activity.5 The Board again found "employee" status
and that the discharge was an unfair labor practice.
On a second petition by the Board for an enforcement order, the
Eighth Circuit again reversed, 52 holding that managerial employees are
not protected from unfair labor practices under the National Labor
Relations Act. In rejecting the Board's new position, the court relied on
both the legislative history of the 1947 amendments and prior Board
policies. Within the legislative history, the court found "nothing. . . to
indicate Congress intended the word 'employee' to have one definition
for the purpose of determining a proper bargaining unit and another
definition for the purpose of determining which employees are protected
from being fired for union activity." Furthermore, the court perceived
an implied congressional intent that the pre-1947 Board practice of
excluding managerial employees was intended to be continued, because
Congress specifically excluded from the Act's coverage supervisory per-
sonnel, who previously had been considered as employees by the
Board,53 but did not expressly extend coverage of the Act to managerial
personnel, who previously had been excluded by the Board.54 The Court
also found support for its holding in the Board's own prior interpreta-
tion of the legislative history, which identified the congressional intent
50. 75 L.R.R.M. at 1069.
51. Id.
52. NLRB v. North Arkansas Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 446 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1971).
53. See Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
54. 446 F.2d at 607-08.
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as exclusion of "all individuals allied with management,""5 and in the
long-standing Board policy excluding managerial employees from cov-
erage under the Act. The court therefore found that protection against
unfair labor practices should be afforded to only those employees pro-
perly included in a bargaining unit, and concluded that the Board's
redefinition would improperly limit "the class of employees not pro-
tected by the Act."56
Before the Eighth Circuit delivered its second North Arkansas
decision, however, the Board had expanded its redefinition of the mana-
gerial employee exclusion to unit determination questions in the case of
Textron, Inc.57 There, the union sought to create a unit of all employees
in Textron's Purchasing and Procurement Department or, if a separate
unit was inappropriate, to include those employees in an existing unit.
The employer argued that neither unit was appropriate, because the
buyers were managerial employees, and under the Board's second North
Arkansas rationale, managerial employees were within the Act's cover-
age only for unfair labor practice purposes and then only when not
involved with labor relations policy formulation. The Board stated,
however, that under its North Arkansas doctrine, managerial employees
are presumptively covered by the Act, and consequently, are entitled
both to protection from unfair labor practices and to "the right to be
represented for the purposes of collective bargaining . . . unless there
is some cogent reason for denying such representation.""8 The employer
then asserted that such a "cogent reason" existed, because the employee
buyers had authority to extend the company's credit and, if unionized,
would be confronted with a conflict of interest when deciding whether
to purchase union or nonunion products. 9 In response, the Board noted
that employee discretion was limited to employer-established guidelines,
so that with strict enforcement by the employer the claimed conflict of
interest could be avoided. The Board therefore concluded that the ap-
propriate unit should include the employees in question."
55. 446 F.2d at 608, citing Swift & Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 752, 753-54 (1956).
56. 446 F.2d at 609-10.
57. 190 N.L.R.B. No. 66, 77 L.R.R.M. 1265 (1971).
58. 77 L.R.R.M. at 1266.
59. Id.
60. The Board noted that the ability to extend the company's credit was bounded by
company-established guidelines, and the fears concerning "make or buy" decisions and a union
purchasing bias could be alleviated through the establishment of other guidelines, especially since
the buyers could not go above a $5000 limit without company approval. 77 L.R.R.M. at 1266. But
see Federal Tel. & Radio Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 1652, 1653-54 (1958) (buyer who could extend up to
$2500 was determined to be managerial).
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Textron then sought reconsideration by the Board in light of the
Eighth Circuit's rejection of the Board's new definition for managerial
employee in the second North Arkansas decision." In denying the mo-
tion, the Board took issue with the Eighth Circuit's view of the relevant
legislative history, by stating that congressional silence with respect to
managerial employees does not indicate either approval or disapproval
of Board policy in this broad area, and does not suggest that Congress
considered any facet of this problem other than the Board's treatment
of personnel associated with the formulation and implementation of the
labor relations policies. 2 The Board recognized the inconsistency of its
prior holdings with its present position, but nevertheless determined that
the critical question in the determination of managerial employee status
is "whether there is a basis in the statute or in common sense for denying
statutory protection and representational rights to all employees who
have any discretion in the formulation, determination, and effectuation
of any employer policy." 3 The Board found a basis for exclusion only
in the labor relations area because the potential for conflict of interest
is greatest among managerial employees whose job functions are con-
nected with this field. Thus the Board declared that the "fundamental
touchstone" of future analysis should be whether a conflict of interest
exists between the decision-making function of the managerial em-
ployee's job and his membership in the labor organization. If the likeli-
hood of such conflict is small, the employee should be accorded full
protection under the Act.64
In sum, the Board has indicated forcefully in Textron that the
classification of an employee as managerial under prior standards does
not now automatically exclude him from coverage under the Act. Under
the Board's view, a second analytic step must be taken-the allegedly
managerial employee must be found to be involved with labor relations
policy formation. This second step is identical to the "confidential"
employee classification in that both focus on an involvement of the
employee with management labor policy, but the confidential class re-
quires only "contact" with labor policy to trigger exclusion, while the
initial step in the managerial classification necessitates involvement with
management policy formulation or effectuation before exclusion will
apply. Consequently, it does not seem necessary to go through the mo-
tions of applying previous standards for determining managerial em-
61. Textron, Inc., 196 N.L.R.B. No. 127, 80 L.R.R.M. 1099 (1972).
62. 80 L.R.R.M. at 1100.




ployee status, since the employee will in effect be excluded or not on
the basis of the confidential employee test. Thus the Board's present
approach apparently has destroyed the separate identity of the manage-
rial employee classification by means of a merger with the defining
criteria applied to the confidential employees.
IV. THE NEW MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEE: AN ANALYSIS
In discharging the responsibilities placed on it by Congress under
the NLRA, the Board necessarily attempts to construe the broad lan-
guage of the statute to effectuate the congressional purpose in light of
the underlying industrial circumstances. As a result, a change in eco-
nomic conditions may lead to an alteration of the legal consequences
of the statutory language of the NLRA. 5 Thus, constant reappraisal of
old standards and definitions is the inevitable result of the Board's
unique role in national labor policy formulation. In Textron and North
Arkansas, this reappraisal has effected an apparent coalescence of the
managerial and confidential employee classifications." The courts, how-
ever, have yet to approve the Board's new approach and additional
employer challenges are almost certain to force further litigation before
the Board and courts over the managerial employee classification. To
prepare for this event, it will be necessary to isolate the underlying
factors that motivated the Board's change in position, and to identify
the obstacles that threaten to impede judicial acceptance of the Board's
new position.
65. One commentator has noted that "[inflation, rising unemployment, growth of corporate
enterprises, and mergers are the source of. . .new and different issues-both in the representa-
tional area and in the unfair labor practice area. Prominent among these are unit issues (citations
omitted), where hitherto settled lines of authority are being reexamined ...." Ordman, The
National Labor Relations Act: A Current and Prospective View, N.Y.U. 23d ANN. CONF. ON
LABOR 3 (1971). The Supreme Court also has indicated that economic changes that produce
"[ilnequality of bargaining power in controversies over wages, hours, and working conditions may
as well characterize the status of one group [of employees] as of [another]." NLRB v. Hearst
Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 127 (1944).
66. The Board's process of reevaluation in North Arkansas and Textron is not without
precedent. In International Metal Prods. Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 65 (1953), the Board's policy of
automatically excluding from the bargaining unit relatives of management who were not statutori-
ly excluded under § 2(3) was reexamined, and as a result, the Board determined that employees
should not be excluded from coverage when the familial relationship did not negate the mutuality
of interest the employee shared with his fellow employees. Id. at 66-67. Similarly, in Quaker City
Life Ins. Co., 134 N.L.R.B. 960 (1961), the Board changed a policy that had declared statewide
units to be appropriate for insurance agency personnel. Since statewide units had not developed
as originally forecast, there was "no longer any rational basis [from the Board's point of view] for
applying different rules of organization to the insurance industry than are applied to other indus-
tries." Id. at 962. Major realignment of Board policy is not a frequent occurrence, but should
continue to be an accepted means of effectuating changes in national labor policy.
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The Board did not articulate the reasons behind its adoption of a
new definition of managerial employee except to state that it was at-
tempting to restore a common-sense approach to the plain meaning of
the statute.67 In the past, criticism has been leveled at the Board for its
failure to set out operative standards by which the courts could judge
managerial status.68 By limiting the area of concern to employee partici-
pation in labor policy formulation, the Board's new test seems to offer
a reasonably workable guideline for the courts. More importantly, the
Board's new position implies that its attitude is changing toward the
relationship of lower level management personnel to their employers.
Just as the foreman's drive for unionization in 1946 might have been a
reaction to the failure of management to recognize and deal with the
foreman's interests," the Board may now sense a deterioration of the
community of interest that has been thought to exist between an em-
ployer and a managerial employee. Under prior standards, a managerial
employee was viewed as one who exercised a certain amount of discre-
tion in the formulation or effectuation of management policies and thus
was management oriented.7 Recently, however, accelerated corporate
growth and a rapid advance in technology have given rise to a greater
concentration of economic power on the side of management71 and a
concomitant bureaucratization of jobs that involve discretionary activi-
ties. For example, in white collar occupations the jobs are increasingly
being made routinely bureaucratic, and involve less supervisory duties,
public contact, and upward mobility.72 Thus many white collar workers'
individuality and sense of alignment with management will tend to dete-
riorate .7 Furthermore, even if there had not been any decline in the
managerial employee identification with management, the Supreme
Court has stated in dicta that identification with management for the
proper discharge of one's job duties is not necessarily incompatible with
identification with a union in labor relations matters.74 The Board ap-
parently has employed this view in the context of the managerial em-
ployee problem by balancing the competing interests of the employer
in employee loyalty with the statutory assurance of full freedom of
67. Textron, Inc., 196 N.L.R.B. No. 127, 80 L.R.R.M. 1099, 1101 (1972).
68. See, e.g., Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. NLRB, 366 F.2d 642, 644-45 & n.5 (D.C. Cir.
1966).
69. Cox, supra note 8, at 4-5.
70. See notes 25-35 supra and accompanying text.
71. Ordman, supra note 64, at 3.
72. See A. SLOANE & E. WiTeY, supra note 11, at 17-18.
73. Id.
74. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. Ill (1944).
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association and collective effort for all employees within its scope.75 The
result of this balancing has been the narrowing of potential exclusion
from the Act's coverage by a narrowing of the function in terms of
which the managerial classification is defined-a narrowing that brings
administrative interpretation more closely in line with the plain meaning
of section 2 (3).
Another factor appears to have played a significant role in the
Board's action. In North Arkansas, the Board was confronted with a
situation in which equitable considerations may have indicated a need
for protection of the employee, while the nature of the employee's job
dictated a managerial classification and thus exclusion from the Act's
coverage. Initially, the Board tried to skirt the issue by classifying the
employee as nonmanagerial, but the Eighth Circuit immediately re-
jected this conclusion. Thereupon, the Board began to alter the effect
of a managerial classification so that managerial status no longer would
dictate an automatic exclusion from coverage under the Act. The old
managerial test is now only part of the question that determines an
individual's status; the focus is now on whether the employee is involved
in labor relations policy formulation. Because the latter test is more
precise and, in the Board's view, better able to effectuate the purpose
of the NLRA, the Board thus may be able in the future to achieve more
equitable results in both unit determination and unfair labor practice
situations.
Although the rationale behind the Board's action appears per-
suasive, there remains the obstacle of the Eighth Circuit's assertion in
North Arkansas that the legislative history of the 1947 amendments
reveals a congressional intent to completely exclude managerial employ-
ees, as defined under the Board's previous standards, from coverage
under the Act. It should be noted, however, that immediately after
passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, Professor Cox warned against heavy
reliance on legislative history in interpreting the Act since the turmoil
surrounding the passage of the Act was so feverish.78 Furthermore, even
if legislative history is relied upon, the Eighth Circuit's analysis is not
persuasive and, if anything, supports the Board's position. The legisla-
tive history relied upon by the court made only one clear reference to
the Board's policy of excluding certain classes of employees: that labor
relations personnel and employees in employment divisions would con-
tinue to be excluded by the Board.77 Since the Board's Textron position
75. See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1966).
76. Cox, supra note 8, at 48.
77. NLRB v. North Arkansas Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 446 F.2d 602, 605-06 (8th Cir. 1971).
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appears to follow this legislative guideline exactly, the court's reliance
on the same language to reverse the Board seems clearly misplaced. In
addition, the implied congressional intent argument used by the
court-that a congressional intent to ratify the Board's past exclusion
of managerial employees could be found from both the statute's specific
exclusion of supervisors, a category previously included by the Board,
and its silence concerning managerial employees, a category previously
excluded-has been rejected as a method of statutory construction by
the Supreme Court."8 When these considerations are added to the
court's own admission that no clear proof of congressional intent can
be gleaned from the legislative history because no specific reference to
the term "managerial employee" can be found in any bill or report,"
the court's use of legislative history does not seem warranted. On the
contrary, these factors at least demonstrate that the legislative history
does not indicate a congressional intent contrary to the Board's action
in redefining the concept of managerial employee.
78. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431-33 (1955).
79. 446 F.2d at 608.
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